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A RUNAWAY JUDICIARY AND LEGISLATURE: WHY PENNSYLVANIA 
SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS RESTRICTION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AWARDS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
KATHERINE D. TOHANCZYN* 
“American government is based on the fundamental recognition that 
the government and government officials can do wrong and must be 
held accountable.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are married with children.  Late one Sunday night, you put 
your two children in the back seat of your car, buckle them in, and begin to 
drive home.  During that very short, and all so routine drive up I-95, you are 
unable to avoid a large pothole, which causes your car to spin out of control and 
flip over.  As a result of the accident, you and your children suffer serious 
bodily injury.2  Sometime after the accident you learn that local government 
officials not only knew of the existence of the pothole but also heavily debated 
the costs and benefits of fixing it.  Despite having the means to fix the road, in 
order to prevent accidents such as yours, the officials ultimately decided to 
simply ignore the pothole and use the money elsewhere.3 
Alternatively, imagine you are on your way to work and you are in a minor 
traffic accident.  You move your car off to the side of the road and, after seeing 
that the other driver is visibly shaken up, you also move their car off to the side 
of the road.  A local cop arrives and begins to talk with the other driver.  As 
additional officers arrive on the scene, you are asked to sit in the back of a 
police car.  After some time, another local cop approaches the police car and 
begins to yell at you.  He then pulls you out of the car and strikes you multiple 
times until you are unconscious.  You wake up in a hospital with your wrist 
handcuffed to a bed.  While the hospital believes they are treating you for 
 
*   Katherine D. Tohanczyn is an Associate at Starfield & Smith, P.C. in Fort 
Washington, Pennsylvania.  She received her law degree from the Villanova University 
School of Law, where she was a managing editor of student works of the Moorad Sports Law 
Journal.  Katherine would like to thank her family and friends for their unwavering support 
and advice. 
1.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 
(2001). 
2.  See 7 Injured when SUV Flips Over on I-95, 6ABC (May 25, 2014) 
http://6abc.com/news/7-injured-when-suv-flips-over-on-i-95/77777/ [https://perma.cc/2J73-
UJ9L]. 
 3.  See Dallas Steele, How Much Public Money Does Your State Spend on NFL 
Football?, MIC (Oct. 2, 2013) http://mic.com/articles/66077/how-much-public-money-does-
your-state-spend-on-nfl-football-check-this-chart [https://perma.cc/R5YL-NDV7] (discussing 
how taxpayers provide, on average, 70% of costs for NFL stadiums).  Taxpayers contributed 
$229 million to building Lincoln Financial Field, the home of the Philadelphia Eagles.  Jim 
Panyard, $1 Billion and Counting for States’ Taxpayer-Funded Stadiums, PENNSYLVANIA 
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injuries sustained in the car accident, in reality you are being treated for injuries 
sustained from the trooper’s unprovoked beating.4 
In instances such as these, you would almost certainly bring a lawsuit 
against the individuals who were directly and indirectly responsible for these 
actions in order to obtain compensation.5  Along with your interest in being 
compensated, the government has an interest in also deterring similar wrongful 
conduct in the future.6  Generally, plaintiffs can bring a lawsuit against the 
wrongdoer and those who inadvertently contribute to the wrong.  For example, 
a plaintiff may bring tort claims against city officials, individual officers, the 
police department, and the city itself for negligent maintenance of the roads, 
false arrest, negligent employment, and negligent supervision.  A plaintiff may 
also bring a constitutional claim for a violation of due process.  Plaintiffs who 
are successful in bringing such claims are generally awarded compensatory 
damages, and in some cases, they may also recover punitive damages.7 
Nevertheless, this basic premise of civil liability for a private injury has 
been greatly curtailed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Grounded in the 
fundamental belief that the government should not be subject to costly litigation 
without its consent, every jurisdiction in the United States has adopted a statute 
limiting a plaintiff’s ability to sue a state, local government, or one of its 
agencies.8  In the event that the governmental entity’s alleged actions are not 
protected by sovereign immunity, most jurisdictions have also implemented 
statutes that limit the type and amount of damages a plaintiff may recover.9 
 
4.  See Stephen J. Borek v. Ramp, No. 3974, 1992 WL 1071393, at * 170 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
Phila. Cnty. May 22, 1992) (discussing how officer instructed plaintiff to sit in back of police 
car and then hit plaintiff multiple times until he was unconscious). 
 5.  See Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 
2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Oct. 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8MG-7FK2] (compiling and interpreting statistics related 
to various civil cases and subsequent damage awards in state courts).  See generally Civil 
Cases, U.S. COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/ 
HowCourtsWork/CivilCases.aspx [https://perma.cc/6EHT-LFSB] (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) 
(providing basics of civil suits in U.S. federal courts). 
 6.  See Tort Actions and Civil Damages, WISC. BRIEF (Nov. 2001) 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/wb/01wb11.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YFE-PYYY] 
(discussing rationale for tort claims is compensation for victims and punishment and 
deterrence of future wrongdoing).  
 7.  See Damages, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/damages 
[https://perma.cc/4LUY-FF2M] (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (providing broad definition of 
compensatory and punitive damages in American civil litigation). 
8.  See Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors 
Share the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 197-98 
(1997) (discussing administrative and substantive purposes of sovereign immunity including 
public benefit and administration of justice).  
 9.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2014) (capping punitive damages at various 
monetary limits depending on the circumstances of the civil action); ALASKA STAT. § 
09.17.020 (2003) (setting evidentiary standard at “clear and convincing evidence); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (2010) (capping damages for intentional torts and products liability at 
$250,000 but allowing unlimited recovery when defendant’s “specific intent to cause harm,” 
or acts “under the influence of alcohol, drugs other than lawfully prescribed drugs”); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2002) (requiring plaintiff to prove defendant acted 
intentionally and with malice and limiting amount to same amount of compensatory damages 
awarded). 
2
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Notably, these statutes often impact the availability of punitive damages.  
Punitive damages are a form of monetary relief that may be awarded to a 
claimant in a civil action when the defendant’s actions are particularly 
egregious.10  States vary in their allowance of punitive damages awards, ranging 
from minor limitations to outright bans.11 
Pennsylvania has taken an overly restrictive approach to both sovereign 
immunity and punitive damages.  More specifically, Pennsylvania’s statutes 
allow a plaintiff to recover for a tort-based cause of action against a government 
entity only when the case fits into a few specific factual scenarios.  However, 
for plaintiffs who can overcome this threshold issue and are able to bring a 
lawsuit against the government, Pennsylvania completely bars recovery of any 
punitive damages regardless of how egregious the defendant’s conduct. 
This article argues that Pennsylvania’s current limitations on punitive 
damages are inconsistent and illogical and urges the Commonwealth, through 
legislation and judicial opinion, to allow plaintiffs—who are successful in 
bringing tort actions against the government—access to such relief.  Part II 
explains the fundamental basis for state sovereign immunity doctrines as well as 
the current structure of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania.  Part III explores 
the history and development of punitive damages, which has led to 
Pennsylvania’s current ban on recovery against governmental entities.  Part IV 
analyzes how Pennsylvania’s current statute is overly broad and inconsistent 
with its own precedent and therefore, detrimental to the Commonwealth.  
Finally, Part V provides Pennsylvania with a solution to its problematic 
approach. 
II. BEFORE ALL ELSE: BACKGROUND ON STATE SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY STATUTES 
It is a generally accepted principle that governmental bodies and their 
employees and agents are immune from suit, unless the state has expressly 
consented to such liability.12  For tort claims, the extent of this immunity varies 
 
 10.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) (“Punitive damages are 
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish 
him for his outrageous conduct”).  Comment a to section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts further provides: “The purposes of awarding punitive damages . . . are to punish the 
person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him and others from similar conduct in the 
future.” Id. 
 11.  Compare ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2014) (limiting punitive damages to greater of 
three times compensatory damages or $500,000), and GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (2010) 
(capping damages for intentional torts and products liability at $250,000 but allowing 
unlimited recovery when defendant’s “specific intent to cause harm,” or acts “under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs other than lawfully prescribed drugs”), and MONT. CODE ANN. § 
27-1-220 (West 2014) (providing that punitive damages may not exceed lesser of $10 million 
or 3% of defendant’s net worth), with Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1, 5 (Mass. 
1891) (“Vindictive or punitive damages are never allowed in this state.”), and Abel v. 
Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Neb. 1960) (refusing to adopt punitive damages). 
12.  See, e.g., Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha, 13 F.2d 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); Mills 
v. Stewart, 247 P. 332, 334-35 (Mont. 1926) (“It is elementary that a state cannot be sued 
without its consent . . . .”); Calkins Dredging Co. v. State, 131 S.E. 665, 668 (N.C. 1926) 
3
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by jurisdiction, as can be seen in the stark contrast between Virginia and 
Pennsylvania.13  A citizen of any state may seek damages from a local or state 
government for a violation of due process regardless of that state’s specific 
sovereign immunity statute.14 
A. Sovereign Immunity as Applied in Tort Cases 
Forty state constitutions provide citizens with an explicit or implied right to 
access the courts in order to seek a remedy against a defendant for an injury to 
their person, reputation, possessions, or property.15  However, the availability of 
that right is generally limited in some manner if the plaintiff is seeking to bring 
a claim against a government agency or employee.  Each state has enacted a 
statute that provides the government some form of immunity from liability for 
tort claims.  For example, in Virginia, the government may be sued for a variety 
of claims including those arising out of intentional torts, which opens the door 
to a potential recovery of punitive damages.16  Conversely, Pennsylvania takes a 
far more stringent view, allowing for suits if two factors are met: (1) the 
governmental action was the result of negligence, and (2) the governmental 
action fits into one of the specific factual situations specifically enumerated in 
the statute.17  As such, Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute generally 
renders recovery of any kind against the government almost impossible. 
1. Virginia’s Commonsense Approach: Allowing Suits for Intentional or 
Reckless Disregard 
While “the doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia,” 
the state has provided injured plaintiffs with a variety of opportunities for 
judicial recovery.18  Under the Virginia Tort Claims Act, the Commonwealth 
 
(explaining state can only be sued when state has consented or if Supreme Court of United 
States has original jurisdiction).  The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on the archaic 
premise that “the King can do no wrong” and was therefore immune from all claims.  See 
generally George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 
LA. L. REV. 476 (1953) (outlining history of sovereign immunity in England and its 
imputation into America).  
 13.  For a comparison of Virginia and Pennsylvania’s tort claims statutes, see infra 
notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
 14.  For a discussion of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see infra notes 24-26 
and accompanying text. 
 15.  See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1901); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 11; DEL. CONST. 
art. I, § 9 (amended 1999); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. 
art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 19; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24; N.H. 
CONST. pt. I, art. 14; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 
11; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; WYO. CONST. 
art. I, § 8.  The ten state constitutions that do not provide for this important right are Alabama, 
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York.  
16.   VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2007).  
17.  42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (West 1986) 
18.  Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Va. 1984) (“Though this Court has, over 
the years, discussed the doctrine in a variety of contexts and refined it for application to 
constantly shifting facts and circumstances, we have never seen fit to abolish it.  Nor does the 
General Assembly want the doctrine abolished.”). 
4
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government is liable for the acts or omissions of its employees or agents that 
amount to gross negligence and intentional torts.19  Another statute similarly 
prohibits local governmental bodies from claiming protection under sovereign 
immunity when the actions of their agents and employees constitute “intentional 
or willful misconduct or gross negligence.”20  Put differently, both the state and 
local governments of Virginia could be liable to an injured plaintiff when its 
agents or employees’ actions are shockingly bad.  Thus, unlike their 
Pennsylvania counterparts, plaintiffs in Virginia have an opportunity to have the 
merits of their case evaluated rather than dismissed simply because the 
defendant is an arm of the government. 
2. Pennsylvania’s Backwards Approach: Limiting Suits to Negligence Claims 
In keeping with the archaic belief that the state should not be encumbered 
by civil lawsuits, Pennsylvania’s legislature has adopted two statutes that 
strictly limit an injured plaintiff’s ability to sue and recover damages against the 
government: (i) the Sovereign Immunity Act and (ii) the Political Subdivision 
Tort Claims Act.  Under the Sovereign Immunity Act, a Commonwealth entity 
or employee may only be sued for ordinary negligence.21  Moreover, under this 
statute, in order to bring a claim against the Commonwealth, this negligence 
must arise out of one of nine explicitly provided instances within the statute.22  
Similarly, the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act preserves the immunity of 
local governmental agencies, except in instances of ordinary negligence arising 
out of one of eight specific situations listed in the statute.23  The Commonwealth 
and local governments remain completely immune from liability for any injury 
 
 19.  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (“[T]he Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for 
money . . . on account of damage to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting within the scope of 
his employment . . . .”). 
20.  VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1405 (West 1997) (waiving sovereign immunity of local 
government and it political subdivision for intentional torts and gross negligence).  Whether 
an employee may claim qualified immunity when sued individually for conduct that occurred 
within the scope of his or her employment, is to be determined applying a four part factors 
test.  See Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 663 (citing James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (Va. 1980)) 
(“(1) the nature of the function performed by the state employee; (2) the extent of the state’s 
interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by 
the state over the employee; and (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of 
judgment and discretion.”).  
21.  See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (West 1986) (preserving 
sovereign immunity except for “for damages arising out of a negligent act”).  
22.  See id. (listing nine scenarios in which state may be sued for negligence as (1) 
vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal 
property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other 
dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) 
National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines).  
23.  Id. § 8542 (providing that local government may only be sued for “negligent acts of 
the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with 
respect to” (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody or control of personal property; (3) care, 
custody or control of real property; (4) dangerous condition of trees, traffic controls or street 
lighting; (5) dangerous condition of utility service facilities; (6) dangerous condition of 
streets; (7) dangerous condition of sidewalks and (8) care, custody or control of animals).   
5
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in which an agent or employee’s actions are intentional or done with a 
substantial disregard for potential injury.  Thus, so long as Pennsylvania 
officials take a passive approach to their jobs, they are essentially immune from 
suit. 
B. Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Section 1983 Claims 
In contrast to state tort statutes, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff can sue 
the government for violation of due process or other civil rights without 
applicability of sovereign immunity.24  While states are generally entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court, local governments are not 
immune from damages resulting from their violation of a citizen’s constitutional 
rights.25  In addition, state sovereign immunity statutes do not shield local 
governments from liability for violations of section 1983.26  Therefore, plaintiffs 
whose civil rights have been violated have a much easier time initially bringing 
a claim against a governmental entity or official. 
However, like tort-based claims, under section 1983 claims, a plaintiff is 
not able to recover punitive damages.  As a general matter, a violation of 
section 1983 is likely to involve egregious conduct.  Because these claims are 
brought against a governmental agency or employee, courts have held that 
recovery of punitive damages is not permitted.  As such, the courts again have 
limited recovery of damages in order to protect the government despite bad 
behavior by the government’s representatives. 
III. BUILDING UP: BACKGROUND ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive damages have been awarded for centuries and have been the 
subject of both support and criticism throughout this period.  For example, early 
American courts wholeheartedly embraced this form of recovery as a valid 
means to punish and deter reprehensible conduct.  However, as the country 
began to move toward tort reform, punitive damages began to be curtailed in 
order to protect a defendant’s rights.  While the current status of punitive 
damage awards ranges across a continuum, Pennsylvania has taken a hardline 
approach when it comes to suits against the government.  More specifically, 
Pennsylvania is currently at an extreme end of the continuum completely 
banning recovery. 
 
24.  42 U.S.C § 1983 (1996).  
25.  Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“Thus the rule has evolved 
that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public 
funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”), with Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“[H]olding that municipalities have no immunity 
from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations . . . .”).  
26.  See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 377-78 (1990) (explaining that section 1983 
preempts state sovereign immunity); see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 
(2006) (noting that Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity when state 
violates citizen’s constitutional rights).  
6
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A. A History of Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages have ancient origins in the legal system, and were even 
noted in the Babylonian Hammurabi Code, the Hindu Code of Manu, and the 
Bible.27  In relatively more modern times, these damages were eventually 
adopted by the English courts in two companion cases in 1763 as a way to deter 
and punish the misuse of power and wealth by aristocracy.28  Like many other 
English-approved legal doctrines, punitive damages were subsequently adopted 
by the American legal system.29 
The early American courts used punitive damages as a means to punish 
those who willfully abused physically weaker individuals.30  With this lofty goal 
underlying courts’ decisions, punitive damages were considered a staple of 
American tort law and almost every state allowed for some form of recovery of 
punitive damages against private individuals.31  Recovery of punitive damages 
was subsequently expanded to allow recovery against corporations in order to 
punish companies who placed profits above the safety of workers and 
consumers.32 
Despite this initially warm embrace of punitive damages, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, divergent views regarding punitive damages began to 
emerge.  Signs of strong opposition to this form of recovery emerged slowly 
and were ultimately embraced in the 1980s, as part of nationwide tort reform.  
As a result, perceived unchecked tort litigation and exuberant damages awards, 
in particular punitive damages awards, many states implemented statutory 
limitations on the recovery of punitive damages.33  While, these statutory 
restrictions were quickly met with various constitutional challenges, most 
remain valid today.34 
 
27.  See Michael Rustand & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive 
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1269, 1285 (1993) 
(noting existence of punitive damages in early legal codes and quoting specific passages from 
Bible).  
 28.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1287-88 (citing Wilkes v. Wood and Huckie 
v. Money as first instance of express adoption of punitive damages in England).  In Wilkes v. 
Wood the publisher of a controversial newspaper sued a member of Parliament for trespass 
after the publisher was arrested for criticizing his speech.  Id. at 1287 n.95.  In Huckle v. 
Money, a journeyman sued agents of the King for false imprisonment and trespass.  Id. at 
1288-89. 
 29.  See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. 6, 7 (U.S. 1784) (“[V]ery serious injury to the 
plaintiff . . . entitled him to very exemplary damages, especially from a professional 
character . . . .”).  In Genay the defendant spiked plaintiff’s wine glass as the two prepared to 
duel, causing the plaintiff “extreme and excruciating pain.”  Id. at 6. 
 30.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1292-93 (discussing early cases and the 
underlying factual premises that contributed to plaintiff’s recovery of punitive damages).  
31.  David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 
39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 369-70 (1994) (discussing how every state but Nebraska provided for 
punitive damages through either common law or statute).  
 32.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1295.  
 33.  See generally Tort Reform Record, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N (December 2014) 
http://www.atra.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Record-12-18-14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ADJ6-ADAS]. 
 34.  See, e.g., Henderson v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878, 884 (Ala. 1993) (discussing 
plaintiff’s claim that statute limiting punitive damages violates right to trial by jury); Mack 
7
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Running parallel to this legislative action, the Supreme Court 
independently sought to reduce the punitive damages awards assessed against 
defendants.  This outcome was accomplished when the Supreme Court held that 
punitive damages awarded without adequate procedural safeguards could 
violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.35  While the 
Supreme Court found certain state limitations on punitive damages to be 
unconstitutional, the presumption is that such limitations on damages are valid 
as an economic regulation, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that they are 
arbitrary or irrational.36 
Today, almost every jurisdiction recognizes the common law doctrine of 
punitive damages.37  In addition, the most prevalent justifications for punitive 
damages continue to be to punish and to deter the defendant and others from 
engaging in such wrongful behavior in the future.38  As such, punitive damages 
are recoverable generally only where the plaintiff is harmed as the result of 
particularly egregious and intentional misconduct.39 
 
Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993) (upholding lower court decision that 
punitive damages cap does not violate equal protection under state constitution).  
 35.  See Pac. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1991) (“As long as the 
discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied.”). 
 36.  Compare BMW of N.A. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-75 (1996) (holding that while 
state may impose punitive damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct, 
grossly excessive damages violated Due Process Clause), and Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 
U.S. 415, 430-35 (1994) (finding that Oregon’s common law violated Due Process), with 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978) (holding that 
Court must “defer to the congressional judgment unless it is demonstrably arbitrary or 
irrational.”).   
37.  See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for Everyone?, 
7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 1 (“All but five [out of fifty states and the District of Columbia] have 
common law or court-made punitive damages, developed and maintained by the state’s 
judiciary with legislative oversight and within federal and state constitutional limits.”). 
38.  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (“Regardless of the 
alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at 
compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Linthicum v. 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 679 (Ariz. 1986) (“Exemplary or punitive damages 
are those damages awarded in excess of full compensation to the victim in order to punish the 
wrongdoer and to deter others from emulating his conduct.”); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 
A.2d 709, 715 (Del. Super. 1967) (noting that punitive damages are intended to punish 
wrongdoer and prevent others from engaging in similar behavior); Winn & Lovett Grocery 
Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 214, 221 (Fla. 1936) (discussing how punitive damages serve as 
deterrent); Foss v. Maine Tpk. Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973) (reasoning that 
deterrence is adequate rationale but that punishment is not a goal); Leimgruber v. Claridge 
Assocs., Ltd., 375 A.2d 652, 654 (N.J. 1977) (stating that punitive damages “are awarded 
upon a theory of punishment to the offender for aggravated misconduct and to deter such 
conduct in the future”); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. 
1964) (holding punitive damages serve strong public policy of punishment and deterrence). 
39.  See, e.g., Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Ala. 1962) (“Punitive 
or exemplary damages are those awarded in excess of actual loss where the wrongdoer’s 
conduct can be characterized as outrageous, such as acts done with malice or bad motives or a 
reckless indifference to the interests of another.”); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 
715 (Del. Super. 1967) (“Punitive damages may be awarded only if the jury finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendants’ actions were motivated by some form of 
malice; that is, by ill-will, hatred, spite, or a conscious desire to do injury and hurt the 
plaintiffs.”); Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 214, 221 (Fla. 1936) (stating that 
8
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B. Pennsylvania’s Hardline Restriction on Punitive Damages 
Under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages are recoverable in connection 
with a number of civil causes of action.40  Pennsylvania has adopted section 908 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which governs punitive damages.41  Under 
the Restatement approach, the goal of punitive damages is to punish and deter a 
tortfeasor from engaging in similar conduct in the future.42  Because it is 
impossible to deter a person from malicious conduct if he is not conscious of 
the risks associated with his conduct, “[t]he state of mind of the actor is vital.”43  
Specifically, in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must present enough evidence to 
demonstrate that “(1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of 
harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to act, as 
the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.”44  Ultimately, in awarding 
damages, a jury must look at the defendant’s actions “together with all the 
circumstances including the motive of the wrongdoer and the relations between 
the parties . . . .”45 
 
punitive damages are only awarded “where torts are committed with fraud, actual malice, or 
deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross 
negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others”); Huebsch v. Larson, 191 
N.W.2d 433, 435 (Minn. 1971) (noting that plaintiff may only recover punitive damages when 
defendant’s actions are “malicious, wilful or in reckless disregard of the rights of others”); 
Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963) (holding that punitive damages may 
only be assess when defendant actions are malicious, wanton, reckless, willful, or oppressive); 
Berberian v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 369 A.2d 1109, 1112 (R.I. 1977) (explaining that 
defendant must have acted with malice, wantonness or willfulness in order for plaintiff to 
recover).   
40.  See, e.g., Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 69 (Pa. 1989) (upholding punitive damage 
award for attorney malpractice); Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co., 11 A.3d 967, 992 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2010) (citing 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303.505 (2002), which allows recovery of 
punitive damages for medical malpractice); Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 
A.2d 978, 983 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (noting plaintiff may recover punitive damages for strict 
products liability); Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. BBB, 872 A.2d 1202, 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) 
(discussing requirements for private plaintiff to recover punitive damages for defamation); 
McDaniel v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 533 A.2d 436, 448 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding 
punitive damages could be recovered against drug manufacturer for deliberately and 
negligently failing to communicate knowledge of serious risk of illness and death resulting 
from drug to medical community); Frisk v. News Co., 523 A.2d 347, 353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986) (upholding recovery of public figure for defamation); Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania 
Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (finding that jury may award punitive 
damages for fraud).  
41.  See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. 1989) (adopting 
section 908 of Restatement (Second) of Torts).   
42.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1965) (“Punitive damages may be 
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless 
indifference to the rights of others.”); see also id. § 500 cmt. a (“Recklessness may consist of 
either of two different types of conduct.  In one the actor knows, or has reason to know . . . of 
facts which create a high degree of risk of . . . harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to 
act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk. In the other the 
actor has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate 
the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so.”).  
43.  See Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 1984).   
44.  See Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. 2005). 
45.  See Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963).  
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Despite a continued acceptance of punitive damages in claims against 
private individuals and corporations, Pennsylvania has taken the extreme 
position that punitive damages may never be recovered against a governmental 
entity in a tort action.  Under section 8528 of the Pennsylvania code, a plaintiff 
bringing suit against the Commonwealth or a local government may only 
recover one of five specifically listed damages: 
(1) Past and future loss of earnings and earning capacity. (2) Pain and 
suffering. (3) Medical and dental expenses including the reasonable value of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental services, prosthetic devices and 
necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, and physical therapy 
expenses accrued and anticipated in the diagnosis, care and recovery of the 
claimant. (4) Loss of consortium. (5) Property losses, except that property 
losses shall not be recoverable in claims brought pursuant to section 
8522(b)(5) (relating to potholes and other dangerous conditions).”46 
While this statute does not specifically bar recovery of punitive damages, 
courts have interpreted the absence of punitive damages from that statute to 
mean that such damages should not be assessed against any Commonwealth or 
local governmental bodies for tort-based actions.47  This interpretation of the 
meaning of the absence of punitive damages, as an explicit remedy, is 
reasonable given that the legislature did explicitly provide for the recovery of 
punitive damages in certain instances of criminal conduct, meaning the absence 
of punitive damages was likely intentional.48 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Pennsylvania’s current statutes create an inequitable approach to punitive 
damage awards against the government that is overly harsh and has resulted in 
negative effects that cause more harm than good.  Specifically, the 
Commonwealth’s ban on punitive damage awards is based on false perceptions 
of the frequency and extent of such awards, and therefore, has resulted in an 
overly strict policy.  As such, this approach impacts a government official’s cost 
benefit analysis of how to handle egregious conduct, thus limiting punitive 
damages most valuable purpose.  This approach also impermissibly grants the 
government an exception from having to pay for its tortious conduct simply 
because of its governing role, which directly contradicts the basic notion that no 
man—including the government—is above the law.  Finally, the legislature’s 
decision to permit a plaintiff to recover damages and to allow an employee to 
seek indemnification when the employee’s actions amount to negligent 
behavior, but prohibit recovery and indemnification for intentional misconduct, 
 
46.  42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (West 1980) (listing damages 
recoverable against government).  
47.  See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986) (finding 
punitive damages could not be awarded against SEPTA because it was Commonwealth 
agency protected by sovereign immunity from such damages).  
48.  See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9183 (West 1980) (imposing counsel 
fees, actual damages, and punitive damages in instances where government official’s conduct 
is willful).  
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is illogical and must be reconsidered. 
A. Pennsylvania’s Limitations on Punitive Damages Are Overly Restrictive 
Given the Current Statistics and Procedural Safeguards 
As discussed below, because excessive punitive damages awards are rare, 
and both the amount and frequency of punitive damage awards are already 
significantly limited, it is unnecessary for states to completely bar recovery of 
punitive damages against the government.  “Since 1979 there has been a 
systematic tort reform backlash against punitive damages in all but a few 
states.”49  This “backlash” and subsequent limitations on punitive damages are 
primarily based upon the media’s sensationalization of the idea that lawsuits 
consistently result in run-away juries.  Part of this media hype also includes the 
notion that exuberant verdicts could cause companies and investors to shy away 
from engaging in business within the state or face bankruptcy.50  Due to this 
unfavorable media exposure, Pennsylvania initially enacted various limitations 
on punitive damages awards to protect American corporations.51 
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania’s legislature subsequently decided to take even 
more stringent steps in order to protect itself.  Specifically, in an effort to 
protect the Commonwealth and local governments from having to foot a 
supposedly unwarranted verdict, the legislature enacted the most restrictive 
limitation possible: a complete ban on punitive damage awards against the 
government.52  Pennsylvania courts also added an additional layer of protection 
by labeling punitive damages awards against the government as contrary to 
public policy.53  As a result, Pennsylvania began to severely limit a plaintiff’s 
recovery for punitive damages against the government.54  Ultimately, this 
 
49.  Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1297, 1311 (2005).  
50.  See id. at 1297 (quoting Richard L. Blatt, ADR Can Help Fend Off Big Punitive 
Awards: Tools Such As Mediation Enable Cost-Effective Resolution Of Claims, 2001 WL 
5,101,243, Apr. 23, 2001, at *10) (“Punitive damages can wreak all kinds of havoc, from 
damaging corporate financial performance in the short run, to threatening a company’s very 
existence.”).  Despite the perception that punitive damages are awarded by out-of-control 
juries, a study of judge and jury trial outcomes in forty-five U.S. states uncovered “a higher 
rate of punitive damages awards in judge trials than in jury trials.”  See Theodore Eisenberg et 
al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 
750 (2002).  
51.  See Rustad, supra note 49, at 1301 (“The story of punitive damages recoil is a 
familiar one about special legislation to help corporate America.”).  
52.  See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (West 1980) (listing damages that 
are recoverable against state and local governments in Pennsylvania, in which punitive 
damages is not included); see also Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998) (noting that 
punitive damages are not recoverable under the Human Relations Act, which allows suit for 
discrimination by private and public individuals).   
53.  See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Pa. 1986) (quoting 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981)) (“In general, courts viewed 
punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would burden the 
very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised.”).  
54.  Compare Mathies v. Mazet, 30 A. 434 (Pa. 1894) (allowing recovery of punitive 
damages against spouse for alienation of affection), with Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 
355 (1963) (striking down punitive damages award against defendant who punched plaintiff in 
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movement—from unlimited recovery to no recovery—was unjustifiably 
extreme because punitive damages are seldom awarded, and when they are 
awarded, such recovery is reasonable.  To the extent that an award is 
unreasonable, the Pennsylvania trial judges have discretion to scale back the 
verdict.55 
The common perception is that punitive damage awards are frequently and 
grossly excessive.56  However, there is little to no empirical evidence supporting 
this belief.  Conversely, numerous studies demonstrate a far more rational 
pattern to awards for punitive damages.  For example, as an initial matter, 
“[u]nless the case involves an intentional tort or a business-related tort (such as 
employment claims), punitive damages will almost never be awarded.”57  And 
even when they are awarded to an injured plaintiff, punitive damage awards are 
rarely the excessive verdicts portrayed in the news.58  Furthermore, verdicts for 
punitive damages tend to be highly correlated to both the plaintiff’s injury and 
 
back of head and continued to punch plaintiff while he was on ground, resulting in serious 
personal injury).  
55.  See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803-04 (Pa. 1989) (“[A]t 
some point the amount of punitive damages may be so disproportionate when compared to the 
character of the act, the nature and extent of the harm and the wealth of the defendant, that it 
will shock the court’s sense of justice.  In those rare instances, the court is given discretion to 
remit the damages to a more reasonable amount.”).  An empirical study found that, in general, 
judges frequently reverse or remit punitive damages awards in the post-verdict stage.  See 
Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages of Products Liability: Testing Tort 
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 51 (1992). 
56.  See, e.g., Thomas B. Hudson, Punitive Damages: How Much Is Too Much?, AUTO 
DEALER MONTHLY (Nov. 2007), http://www.autodealermonthly.com/channel/dps-
office/article/story/2007/11/punitive-damages-how-much-is-too-much.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Z9A4-HYW9] (“The court’s award of punitive damages—less than twice 
the actual damages award—should help keep Texas jury awards under control.”); Jennifer 
Kay, U.S. Tobacco Company Hit With $23.6B In Punitive Damages After Widow’s Lawsuit, 
CTV NEWS (July 19, 2014), http://www.ctvnews.ca/health/u-s-tobacco-company-hit-with-23-
6b-in-punitive-damages-after-widow-s-lawsuit-1.1922027#ixzz3I8ZbOtGY 
[https://perma.cc/7D3U-YDNG] (discussing various “large jury verdicts awarding tens of 
millions of dollars” in punitive damages against tobacco companies); Michael Wilt, California 
Court: Excessive Punitive Damages Are Fine If You’re Wealthy Enough, FORBES (Aug. 19, 
2011, 1:32 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2011/08/19/california-court-excessive-
punitive-damages-are-fine-if-youre-wealthy-enough/ [https://perma.cc/B7ZD-DDA3] (“If 
there are no limits to what punitive damages can be levied against a defendant merely because 
they can afford to pay them, juries would be empowered to bankrupt corporations even though 
the relative harm to the plaintiff in compensatory damages does not demand such a result.”).  
57.  Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 623 (1997).  
58.  See CAROL DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JURY CASES AND 
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4be2/ 
42ed0c1732f47b6537fbfbc3a4d0f63457f5.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB29-NJGH] (“Punitive 
Damages were awarded in 6% of the jury case with a plaintiff winner.”); see also Michael 
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: 
Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters”, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1009 
(1995) (“The typical (median) punitive damage award [in a medical malpractice claim] was 
quite modest, $228,600.”); Rustad, supra note 55, 45-50 (finding that out-of-control juries are 
part of media hype and in reality punitive damage awards in products liability cases are “quite 
modest” and were roughly “proportional to actual damages”). 
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the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions.59 
If allowed against the Commonwealth or local governments, it is unlikely 
that punitive damage awards would become as unreasonable or excessive as the 
news stories portray due to the extensive procedural safeguards put into place 
by the Pennsylvania legislature and judiciary.  As discussed above, punitive 
damage awards have a heightened standard and may only be recovered when 
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or 
willful.60  This mens rea-like requirement is also extended to strict liability 
actions, meaning that a defendant may present evidence, which would 
ordinarily be inadmissible, that his conduct was reasonable and therefore, 
punitive damages are inappropriate.61  Moreover, in order to recover punitive 
damages in a defamation case, and arguably in other tort cases, a plaintiff must 
provide clear and convincing evidence to support his or her claim, which is 
more than the general burden of by a preponderance of the evidence.62 
In addition to heightened burden of proof, Pennsylvania courts also seek to 
minimize the potential prejudice of the jury in various ways.  For example, 
courts generally require the jury to consider and render separate verdicts for 
compensatory and punitive damages.63  Pennsylvania has also developed a 
special rule of civil procedure governing discovery and admissibility of a 
defendant’s wealth as evidence so as to prevent prejudice the jury.64  Finally, the 
courts may also choose to bifurcate verdicts based on compensatory and 
punitive damages.65 
 
59.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 58, 1027-29 (finding that in medical malpractice 
claims resulting in punitive damages, 33% of plaintiffs were killed, 25% of plaintiffs suffered 
permanent disability, 24% involved severe emotional trauma, and 50% involved sexual abuse 
or assaults).  
60.  See Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 69 (Pa. 1989) (“The act or omission must be 
intentional, reckless, or malicious.”); Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 
1963) (“exemplary damages must be based on ‘“malicious,” “wanton,” “reckless,” “willful,” 
or “oppressive” conduct on the part of defendant’”) (internal citations omitted).  For further 
discussion of Pennsylvania’s state of mind requirement, see supra notes 43-45 and 
accompanying text.  
61.  Nigro v. Remington Arms Co., 637 A.2d 983, 989-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) 
abrogated on different grounds by Aldridge v. Edmunds, 750 A.2d 292 (Pa. 2000) 
(“Compliance with industry standard and custom tends to support the defense that Remington 
acted with a nonculpable state of mind, and would negate an inference of wanton indifference 
to the rights of others. Accordingly, such evidence is material and admissible to refute Nigro’s 
claim for punitive damages.”). 
62.  See Bargerstock v. Wash. Greene Cmty. Action Corp., 580 A.2d 361, 366 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990) (explaining clear and convincing standard, which is higher than ordinary 
preponderance of evidence, is required in defamation clams); see also Temporaries, Inc. v. 
Krane, 472 A.2d 668, 674 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (“Had we heard the case in the first 
instance we might not have imposed punitive damages, which must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence.”).  
63.  See Givens v. W.J. Gilmore Drug Co., 10 A.2d 12, 16 (Pa. 1940) (ordering lower 
court to instruct jury to indicate amount of compensatory and punitive damages separately).  
64.  PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.7 (“A party may obtain information concerning the wealth of a 
defendant in a claim for punitive damages only upon order of court setting forth appropriate 
restrictions as to the time of the discovery, the scope of the discovery, and the dissemination 
of the material discovered.”). 
65.  See Mitchell v. Randal, 137 A. 171, 172-73 (Pa. 1927) (“[W]hen punitive as well 
as compensatory damages are involved in a case like the one now before us, it is entirely 
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Despite the common assumption that multi-million dollar verdicts are 
awarded regularly, recovery of punitive damages are proportional to the 
defendant’s conduct and actual damages.  To the extent that punitive damages 
are awarded to injured plaintiffs, Pennsylvania has implemented numerous 
procedural safeguards at various parts of the litigation process.  These 
procedures help to ensure that both the frequency and amount of punitive 
damages is not excessive and that the defendant’s rights are adequately 
protected.  As such, any outright ban on punitive damages is unnecessary and 
unjustly restricts a plaintiff’s ability to recover additional damages at the benefit 
of the defendant.  This approach also allows the defendant to escape paying for 
the full extent of his or her misconduct.  Thus, such policy only results in 
defeating the very purpose of such damages: punishment and deterrence of the 
defendant tortfeasor. 
B. Pennsylvania Is Overlooking the Value of the Electoral Process as a Means 
of Deterrence Due to Political Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
Under Pennsylvania’s approach, punitive damages are intended to punish 
the tortfeasor and deter similar conduct in the future.66  In the private arena, 
these goals are accomplished by determining an amount of damages directly 
proportional to the defendant’s wealth.67  On the other hand, it is generally 
argued that when the defendant is the government, it cannot be adequately 
punished because the government theoretically has unlimited wealth through its 
taxation authority.68  In line with this idea of unlimited taxation power, critics 
also claim that the government cannot be adequately deterred because 
taxpayers, and not the tortfeasors, bear the costs of a punitive damages award.  
However, this position ignores the fact that government officials respond to 
political incentives.  Punitive damages offer a form of a “negative incentive” 
that could deter government employees and agents from acting in an egregious 
or malicious manner that results in some form of injury to an innocent plaintiff. 
As a comparison, a punitive damages award against a corporation is 
considered to be a successful deterrent of future misconduct because generally 
corporations are focused on profit-maximization and therefore, will take steps to 
avoid unnecessary expenses and losses.  From an economic standpoint, punitive 
 
proper to have separate findings made by the jury when rendering the verdict.”).  
66.  See G.J.D. v. Johnson, 669 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“An award of 
punitive damages under Pennsylvania law serves a deterrence function as well as a 
punishment function.”).   
67.  See Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 1984) (stating that while defendant’s 
wealth is irrelevant to compensatory damages, it may be used to determining punitive 
damages).   
68.  See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986) (quoting 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (“Indeed, punitive damages 
imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are 
likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or reduction of public services for the citizens 
footing the bill.”)); c.f. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 408 (2000) (“Recognizing that 
constitutional tort compensation ultimately comes from the pockets of taxpayers further 
attenuates the connection between moral responsibility and the burden of rectification.”).  
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damages are intended to provide an incentive for private individuals and profit 
seeking companies to take appropriate steps to “invest in precautions” in order 
to avoid paying large verdicts.69  While the government is not interested in 
profits, the government does engage in a modified form of this cost-benefit 
analysis.70  This analysis is focused on responding appropriately to the 
preferences and complaints of its constituents because votes matter.71 
The primary goal of an elected official72 is ultimately to win the next 
election.73  To accomplish this objective, an official must act in a manner that 
will result in the majority of voters choosing to elect him or her.  Similarly, an 
official must also avoid situations that can be used by the political opposition.  
For example, in their capacity as governmental agents and employees, elected 
officials must allocate the budget in order to maximize public benefits and to 
avoid wasteful or unpopular spending.74  If a governmental agency or 
employee’s willful and wanton conduct results in a punitive damage award, that 
judgment and its corresponding litigation costs will be paid with tax money.  
Because a public budget is unlikely to have a lump sum set aside for this award, 
the government must raise that money by (1) diverting spending from publically 
funded programs, (2) incurring debt, or (3) raising taxes.75 
Overall, none of these options are likely to bestow any benefit on a current 
government official, but each carries substantial risks.  An elected official that 
chooses to reallocate spending to pay for the litigation expenses and a punitive 
 
69.  A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 944 (1998) (discussing how judgment-proof contractors “will tend to 
conduct their activities with less care than will actors with more at stake”).  
70.  See MICHAEL I. KRAUSS, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 343-50 (2d ed. 
2011) (discussing the “economics” of products liability law and how companies asses benefits 
and risks of certain actions).  
71.  Levinson, supra note 68, at 370 (“So long as the social benefits of constitutional 
violations exceed the compensable costs to the victim and are enjoyed by a majority of the 
population, compensation will never deter a majoritarian government from violating 
constitutional rights, because the majority of citizens will gain more from the benefits of 
government activity than they lose from the taxes necessary to finance compensation 
payments to victims.”).   
72.  While there are plenty of unelected governmental officials, the chain of command 
above these unelected officials will lead directly to an elected official.  As such, if a punitive 
damages award is handed down, it will impact the elected officials due to their lack of 
oversight, which will lead the elected official to implement punishments and restrictions down 
the ladder to prevent further instances.  
73.  See generally Gary Biglaiser & Claudio Mezzetti, Politician’s Decision Making 
with Re-election Concerns 66 J. PUB. ECON. 425 (1997) (analyzing factors politicians take 
into account in order to “further their own political interests” and ensure re-election).  
74.  See Ross Ramsey, Promising to Redirect Budget Money Spent on Those Pet 
Projects, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/us/promising-to-
redirect-budget-money-spent-on-those-pet-projects.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D6F8-
ZTMN] (“All they have to do is figure out how to either cut the budget to fit or find $1.3 
billion to pay for the state police and the Department of Motor Vehicles and other items 
caught in the ‘pet projects’ net.”). 
75.  See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986) (quoting 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (“Indeed, punitive damages 
imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are 
likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or reduction of public services for the citizens 
footing the bill.”)).  
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damage judgment against a government employee, does so at the peril of facing 
severe political backlash from the opposing party in the next election.76  In 
addition, incurring debt is also a popular topic in political election speeches and 
television commercials because voters care about having to pay that money 
back in the future.  Furthermore, every politician knows that individuals do not 
appreciate their own taxes being increased, regardless of the reason.77  And 
while taxpayers may not like paying government salaries, they are likely to 
dislike footing the bill, either now or in the future, for a governmental 
employee’s intentional misconduct even more.  Despite potential political 
apathy, if a punitive damages judgment is entered against a governmental 
agency or employee, it is likely to make media headlines, and such publicity can 
be politically damaging.78 
Ultimately this allocation of political risks is important due to the basic 
notion that taxpayers who are upset with the government’s actions will hold 
 
76.  See, e.g., Karen Shuey, Fact Check: Corbett Defends his Education Spending 
Record amid Criticism, LANCASTER ONLINE (Sep. 12, 2014), https://lancasteronline.com/ 
news/local/fact-check-corbett-defends-his-education-spending-record-amid-criticism/ 
article_55f511de-3a9f-11e4-aa2b-001a4bcf6878.html [https://perma.cc/VD9A-EXAT] 
(reviewing debate between Pennsylvania governor candidate’s regarding whether incumbent 
cut took funding away from education); Jonathan Oosting, Fact Check: Did Michigan Gov. 
Rick Snyder Cut $1 Billion From Education or Add $660 Per Student?, MLIVE.COM (Feb. 5, 
2014, 8:07 AM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/02/fact_check_did_michigan_ 
gov_ri.html [https://perma.cc/53Q6-KS93] (quoting candidate as saying his candidate “cut $1 
billion from public schools . . . and taxed retirement funds all to create tax breaks for 
corporations that aren’t creating jobs.”)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
77.  See TIMOTHY BESLEY & ANE CASE, INCUMBENT BEHAVIOR: VOTE SEEKING, TAX 
SETTING AND YARDSTICK COMPETITION 26 (1992) https://www.princeton.edu/~accase/ 
downloads/Incumbent_Behavior.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUA3-QSPY] (arguing that raising 
taxes tends to hurt politicians’ reelection prospects); see also Ken Blackwell & Bob Morrison, 
Broken Promises/Broken Presidencies, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2013, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ken-blackwell/broken-promisesbroken-pre_b_4181566.html 
[https://perma.cc/P4HL-Q3RU] (quoting George H.W. Bush)(“Read my lips, no new taxes”)); 
Greenville County Voters Reject Penny Sale Tax Increase, (WYFF broadcast Nov. 5, 2014), 
available at http://www.wyff4.com/news/greenville-county-voters-reject-penny-sales-tax-
increase/29567182 [https://perma.cc/5CH4-D7MZ] (discussing how taxpayers rejected penny 
increase in taxes during 2014 elections).  Taxes are such an important issue to voters that a 
pledge is currently making its way around Capitol Hill which asks political candidates to put 
their promise to not raise taxes in writing.  See About the Taxpayer Protection Pledge, 
AMERICANSFORTAXREFORM.COM, http://www.atr.org/about-the-pledge [https://perma.cc/ 
QF4C-GKNC] (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (promoting Taxpayer Protection Pledge).  
78.  See, e.g., Cari Herman, Dr. King Family’s Civil Trial Verdict: U.S. Government 
Assassinated Martin, WASHINGTONBLOG.COM (Jan. 16, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/01/dr-king-familys-civil-trial-verdict-us-government-
assassinated-martin.html [https://perma.cc/SHP6-7B9Q] (explaining case brought by Martin 
Luther King’s family against U.S. government for wrongful death); John Monk, Sheriff Lott 
Says $1.6 Million Lexington Jury Verdict Against His Department “Excessive,” Lacks 
Evidence, THESTATE.COM (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.thestate.com/2014/08/25/3639967/ 
sheriff-lott-says-16-million-lexington.html [https://perma.cc/L8YR-R99T] (discussing verdict 
levied against police department and county for malicious prosecution and abuse of process); 
Bob Sipchen, Whines, Cynicism Follow in Wake of LAPD Trial for Beating of Rodney King, 
LA TIMES (June 25, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-25/news/vw-1326_1_rodney-
king [https://perma.cc/43M7-BUB9] (reviewing media coverage of infamous trial regarding 
police brutality against Rodney King).  
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these individuals accountable through the voting process.79  Therefore, an 
elected official who fails adequately supervise or negligently employs an 
individual who ultimately engages in malicious and wonton conduct is likely to 
face serious backlash from the voting populous.  As a result, political cost-
benefit analysis facilitates direct, internal checks on the actions of the 
government officials, employees, and agents.  Specifically, government officials 
would need to take proactive steps to ensure that all employees acted within the 
bounds of the law and did not engage in reprehensible conduct.  Put differently, 
these officials would take all necessary steps to ensure that such conduct does 
not happen again, thereby fulfilling one of the key rationales for punitive 
damages: deterrence.80 
C. Pennsylvania’s Approach Creates an Impermissible Exception for the 
Government that Undermines the Basic Notions of the United States 
Constitution 
The federal and state courts’ analysis of the requisite state of mind 
requirement for punitive damages varies based on the defendant and in doing so 
contradicts current Pennsylvania precedent.  As previously noted, punitive 
damages may only be recovered when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
defendant’s conduct is intentionally malicious and outrageous.81  In its analysis 
of a tort claim, one Pennsylvania state court held that punitive damages may not 
be imposed upon the government under a theory of vicarious liability.82  Shortly 
thereafter, a federal court also shielded a local government from the vicarious 
imposition of punitive damages in section 1983 cases.83  These decisions are 
premised on the argument that because the government is not a living, breathing 
being, it cannot form the requisite intent.84 
 
79.  Kevin Arceneaux, The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held 
Accountable for the Functions Relevant to Their Office?, 27 POL. PSYCH. 731, 731 (2006) 
(“By structuring the political system such that ‘[t]he federal and state governments are in fact 
but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers’ . . . the 
framers of the American constitution sought to strengthen accountability and preserve 
freedom.”).   
80.  In a sense elected officials themselves are deterred; however, this argument is 
premised more on the belief that punitive damages are intended to deter both the tortfeasor as 
well as other individuals from engaging in or condoning intentional malicious conduct.  See, 
e.g., G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1130 (Pa. 1998) (finding purpose of legislature 
allowing recovery of punitive damages against tortfeasor’s estate was to deter others); 
Sprague v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 922-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“[P]unitive damages are 
granted in such cases to punish the defamer’s ‘actual or apparent ill will’ and to deter others 
from acting from ‘evil volition’ when engaging in similar conduct.”).  
81.  See Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963) (holding that punitive 
damages may only be assessed when defendant actions are malicious, wanton, reckless, 
willful, or oppressive).  For further discussion of Pennsylvania’s state of mind requirement, 
see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. 
82.  See Bensalem Twp. v. Press, 501 A.2d 331, 339 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (“[W]e 
believe that assessment of such damages against a municipality under a theory of vicarious 
liability is prohibited.”).  
83.  See Scott v. Twp. of Bristol, No. CIV.A. 90-1412, 1990 WL 178556, at *8 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 14, 1990) (holding that government is not vicariously liable for punitive damages). 
84.  Means v. City of McKeesport, No. CIV.A. 11-1092, 2012 WL 6552835, at *9 
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While this position, in and of itself, is logical, it directly contradicts 
existing Pennsylvania precedent regarding assessing punitive damages against a 
corporation, which, despite also not being a living, breathing being, has been 
found to be able to form the requisite intent.  In fact, since 1886, Pennsylvania 
courts have continually held that an injured plaintiff may recover punitive 
damages against a principal (including a business entity) for torts committed by 
the principal’s agents acting within the scope of their employment.85  In 
addition, this liability will exist even if the principal did not specifically order or 
condone the agent’s actions.86  Despite this established history, Pennsylvania 
courts created an exception for the government when the issue first came in 
front of the court almost one hundred years later, in 1985.87  Even though the 
courts were willing to engage in a legal fiction to find that a principal 
corporation may form the requisite intent despite not being a person, the court 
refused to adopt a similar approach when the defendant principal is a public 
counterpart.  Yet, no reason is offered to explain why the government is any 
different from a corporation when it comes to forming the requisite state of 
mind. 
Generally, an essential method for ensuring accountability is by assessing 
damages against the wrongdoer.88  The potential of having to pay such damages, 
especially those tied to the egregiousness of one’s conduct and one’s wealth, 
provides an incentive to act lawfully.  Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity 
statutes already significantly diminish accountability because officials will 
rarely have to answer for their actions in court.  Similarly, the bar on punitive 
damages means that even when the government’s conduct fits into one of the 
fact-specific exceptions to sovereign immunity and a lawsuit is brought, the 
government is exempt from having to pay additional damages as a result of that 
egregious conduct. 
Under Pennsylvania law, this immunity from punitive damages exists even 
when the government’s action amounts to an egregious violation of tort or 
 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2012) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-
67 (U.S. 1981)) (“Because a municipality can have no malice independent of its officials, 
punitive damages are not sensibly assessed against the government entity itself.”). 
85.  See Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 6 A. 545, 553 (Pa. 1886) (“The 
corporation is liable for exemplary damages for the act of its servant, done within the scope of 
his authority, under circumstances which would give such right to the plaintiff as against the 
servant were the suit against him instead of the corporation.”); see also Delahanty v. First Pa. 
Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding private entity vicariously 
liable for punitive damages); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Genteel, 499 A.2d 637, 643 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985) (explaining that imposition of vicarious liability for punitive damages based 
on actions of agent is consistent with Pennsylvania precedent). 
86.  See Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“In 
Pennsylvania, there is no requirement that an agent commit a tortious act at the direction of 
his principal, nor must the principal ratify the act, in order for punitive damages to be imposed 
on him.”).  
87.  See generally Bensalem, 501 A.2d at 331 (describing court-created exception) 
88.  See generally James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private 
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1862 (2010) (reviewing cases in which government officials were held liable for 
damages and discussing how these decisions result in government accountability).  
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constitutional law.  As such, citizens have been stripped of an important weapon 
to ensure that the government complies with either state or federal laws.  
Furthermore, without the threat of having to pay, there is no incentive for 
government officials to implement controls or supervise individuals so as to 
prevent additional violations in the future. 
This policy circumvents the basic purposes of punitive damage awards and 
thereby increases the likelihood that similar misconduct, unchecked and 
unpunished, will continue to occur.  Punitive damage awards provide two 
important functions consistent with obtaining both government accountability 
through the punishment and deterrence objectives of punitive damages.  First, 
these awards are a means to ensure that upper level officials are providing 
adequate oversight of lower level employees.  Second, these verdicts are also 
likely to result in weeding out those who abuse their positions or continually act 
in a way that is harmful toward others. 
It is not surprising that the legislature has promulgated rules in order to 
protect itself and other aspects of the government.  However, this decision is not 
only short-sighted but is also a blatant disregard for the fact that government 
officials are intended to be public servants who faithfully fulfill their duties to 
the citizens, not untouchable figureheads who are beyond the purview of 
internal or external accountability. 
D. The Legislature’s Decision to Limit Indemnification for Intentional 
Misconduct is Inconsistent and Illogical 
As previously discussed, Pennsylvania’s current statutory scheme allows a 
plaintiff to recover damages when a government’s agent or employee’s actions 
amount to negligence.  However, a plaintiff is completely barred from 
recovering damages when that same individual intentionally and maliciously 
injures the plaintiff.  Generally, local municipalities may waive governmental 
immunity so that an injured party may sue an employee of a local government 
as an individual for damages when the employee’s actions or omissions were 
the cause of the injuries.89  For example, the City of Philadelphia has adopted 
such a waiver provision within their local code that enables suits against a 
police officer when the officer’s conduct results bodily injury or death.90 
According to one Pennsylvania statute, when a judgment is entered against 
one of these government employees, that employee may seek indemnification 
for costs associated with the judgment.91  Most notably, under the statute, an 
 
89.  See Borek v. Ramp, No. 3974., 1992 WL 1071393, at *179-80 (Pa. Com. Pl. Phila. 
Cnty. May 22, 1992) (citing Borenstein v. City of Phila., 595 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Pa. 1984)) 
(noting that while Pennsylvania Tort’s Claim Act extends immunity to local governments, 
municipalities may waiver such immunity).  
90.  See Williams v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 5235, 1989 WL 817137, at *452 (Pa. 
Com. Pl. Phila. Cnty. July 12, 1989) (quoting § 21-701 of Philadelphia Code) (“(a) The City 
shall not plead governmental immunity as a defense in any action commenced by any person 
sustaining bodily injury or death caused by negligence or unlawful conduct of any person 
sustaining bodily injury or death caused by negligence or unlawful conduct of any police 
officer while the latter is acting within the scope of his office or employment.”).  
91.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8548(a) (1980) (“[T]he local agency shall 
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employee is entitled to recover such amounts regardless of the type of damages 
assessed against the employee, including punitive damages.92  In order for an 
employee to successfully obtain such indemnification, three conditions must be 
met: “[1] the judgment is for damages to person or property, and he [2] has 
given timely notice of the local agency, and . . . [3] the employee in good faith 
reasonably believed that such act was, within the scope of his office or 
duties . . . .”93  As such, this statute creates the possibility for an injured plaintiff 
to indirectly recover damages from the government so long as the suit is 
brought against an intermediary: a government employee.  Moreover, under the 
plain language of this statute, a plaintiff is not limited in what damages may be 
recovered. 
However, a secondary statute eliminates the state’s duty to indemnify an 
employee if the employee actions constitute a “crime, actual fraud, actual 
malice or willful misconduct.”94  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that 
willful misconduct is the same as an intentional tort.95  Through this exception, 
the Pennsylvania legislature not only defeated the plain language of another 
statue, but also created a situation where the government itself is in a better 
situation if their employees act with a wonton disregard for the very citizens 
those employees are intended to protect.  Thus, the Commonwealth is 
essentially incentivized to not adequately supervise its employees or discourage 
bad behavior because if a government takes such precautions then they are more 
likely to be liable.  Put differently, if a local police officer accidently injures an 
individual, then, under the first statute above, the government would be required 
to indemnify the officer after a judgment was entered against him.  However, if 
that officer intentionally inflicts serious bodily harm on the same individual, the 
state is immune from a plaintiff’s suit for damages as well as the officer’s suit 
for indemnification. 
On their face, these outcomes are inconsistent with basic notions of what is 
fair and just.  Thus, they are likely to cause feelings of distrust and frustration 
towards the government for instituting rules that not only favor the government 
but also condone willful misconduct by the government.  By allowing indirect 
recovery against the government through the indemnification of employees, 
Pennsylvania began to move toward a more equitable approach.  However, by 
limiting indemnification for willful conduct, the state has created an exception, 
which defeats the plain language of another statute and that is just plain 
senseless. 
V. WHERE PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD GO FROM HERE: AMENDING THE 
 
indemnify the employee for the payment of any judgment on the suit.”) (emphasis added).  
92.  Wiehagen v. Borough of N. Braddock, 594 A.2d 303, 306 (1991) (“The case sub 
judice is an indemnification action, which is not an action for damages under the Act, and 
thus, is not subject to the damage limitations set forth in Section 8553.”).  
93.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8548(a) (providing parameters for indemnification of 
employee of local agency).  
94.  Id. § 8550.  
95.  Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (“In other words, the 
term ‘willful misconduct’ is synonymous with the term ‘intentional tort.’”). 
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LAWS TO ALLOW FOR RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Pennsylvania’s current statutes create an unnecessarily strict and 
inequitable approach to punitive damage awards.  The state’s sovereign 
immunity statutes, in and of themselves, already provide the government with 
an extreme amount of protection from civil liability generally.  In order for 
Pennsylvania to assure public confidence, it must allow for recovery of punitive 
damages awards when the government’s actions are particularly egregious.  To 
the extent that there is continued concern about the allowance of such recovery, 
the state may implement additional procedural safeguards so long as they do not 
amount to excessive limitations. 
A. Pennsylvania Is Adequately Protected by Sovereign Immunity and Does 
Not Need to Limit Recovery of Damages 
Pennsylvania’s legislature has already significantly limited the scope of the 
government’s liability and therefore it is unnecessary to also ban a form of 
recovery.  The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity provides the 
government with immunity from suit unless such immunity has been 
specifically waived.96  The extent to which this immunity is waived to allow 
injured plaintiffs a means of redress in court varies by jurisdiction. 
While Pennsylvania’s legislature has taken a restrictive approach to 
sovereign immunity, Pennsylvania courts have offered plaintiffs in certain 
situations the possibility of relief by refusing to extend immunity under this 
statute to include statutory causes of action.97  Nevertheless, a majority of claims 
that may be brought against the government in other states are still protected by 
sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania.  Such robust immunity not only frustrates 
but blatantly prevents the two intended purposes of civil litigation—
compensation for the injured party and deterrence of future wrongdoing—from 
being accomplished. 
Therefore, when such immunity can be overcome, the government should 
allow all avenues to accomplish these objectives, including the availability of 
punitive damages.  As previously discussed, punitive damages may only be 
recovered in a minute percent of cases generally.  Given the statistical 
likelihood the injured plaintiff will be able to overcome both sovereign 
immunity and the burden of proof for punitive damages, an outright ban on the 
recovery of punitive damages is unnecessary. 
 
 
96.  See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (1978) (reaffirming state has blanket sovereign 
immunity unless waived).  This immunity also applies to suits brought against states in federal 
court under the Eleventh Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”) 
97.  See Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 606 Pa. 539, 546 (2010) (“We hold that 
governmental immunity does not extend to all statutory causes of action, regardless of 
whether they sound in tort or contract.”).  
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B. Pennsylvania’s Legislature Has Begun to Move the State in the Right 
Direction 
The Pennsylvania legislature created a statute that indirectly allows an 
injured plaintiff to recover damages from local governments.  However, that 
recovery has been limited to exclude situations arising out of a defendant’s 
malicious or willful conduct, or put differently, in instances where the plaintiff 
would be able to overcome the burden of proof to establish a right to recover 
punitive damages. 
To avoid remaining inconsistent with its own precedent, Pennsylvania 
should alter its sovereign immunity statutes to allow for recovery of punitive 
damages when governmental agencies and employees act with complete 
disregard for a person or their property.  The purpose of a lawsuit and punitive 
damages is to deter future misconduct; which Pennsylvania’s current waiver of 
sovereign immunity fails to do.  Instead, these statutes continue to protect the 
state in the most egregious of instances, thereby perpetuating such wrongful 
behavior. 
The Pennsylvania Legislature should examine the potential political costs 
and benefits that may result from allowing the recovery of punitive damages 
from the government.  After discerning the potential benefits that could result 
from allowing the democratic purpose to work as intended, the legislature 
should amend section 8528 of the Pennsylvania Code to allow for recovery of 
punitive damages in instances when a plaintiff is able to overcome the stringent 
standards of Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute.  Because that section is 
formatted as a list, the legislature would simply need to add a number six to the 
list as punitive damages. 
In allowing this method of direct recovery, the state would not necessarily 
need to abolish the statute prohibiting indemnification when an employee’s 
actions amount to a “crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.”98  
In fact, the preservation of this statute provides an additional incentive for 
employees to refrain from acting in an egregious manner because those 
employees can be sued as individuals and would have to pay any potential 
judgment out of their own pocket. 
Nevertheless, this statute alone is not enough to accomplish deterrence.  
Specifically, individuals who may have indirectly contributed to the harm, such 
as managers who may have been negligent in hiring and/or supervising the 
tortfeasor, unless sued individually, would not be answerable for such conduct.  
On the other hand, if punitive damages were awarded against the government 
agency as a whole, all individuals involved, either directly or indirectly would 
have to answer for their conduct.  Therefore, it is mandatory that Pennsylvania 
at the very least changes section 8528 of the Pennsylvania Code to allow for 
recovery of punitive damages. 
 
98.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8550. 
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C. To the Extent Concerns Remain, Pennsylvania’s Legislature or Judiciary 
May Also Implement Additional Procedural Safeguards 
Pennsylvania’s legislature and judiciary have implemented numerous 
procedural safeguards to protect massive and unwarranted punitive damages 
awards.  As previously discussed, these safeguards include a heightened burden 
of proof, bifurcated verdicts, and limited discovery of the defendant’s wealth.  
Pennsylvania could adopt even stricter approaches to these safeguards as well as 
implement new restrictions.  These procedural steps can be used to both limit a 
plaintiff’s ability to recover damages as well as scaling back excessive awards 
after they have been handed down. 
For example, Pennsylvania’s legislature could limit the recovery of 
punitive damages by increasing the evidentiary standard of proof.  Pennsylvania 
has increased the burden of proof for defamation cases to an “intermediate 
level” of proof in which “clear and convincing evidence” must be presented.99  
If it so chooses, the state legislature could institute this heightened burden of 
proof to other torts equally.  Alternatively, the state could go a step further and 
require an even higher standard, such as the burden under criminal law, which 
requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”100  Arguably, this heightened 
burden is logical because punitive damages fill in the “gaps” in the criminal law 
by allowing “citizens [to] serve as prosecutors” or “private attorneys general.”101 
If concerns regarding such awards remain, the legislature and judiciary 
may add additional precautions to ensure that these statistics remain the status 
quo.  For example, in order to prevent juror bias, trial judges could limit what 
arguments about punitive damages attorneys may raise during trial.  
Alternatively, the judiciary may prohibit the mentioning of punitive damages at 
trial until plaintiff’s attorney has established a prima facie case allowing such 
recovery. 
Overall, these protections ensure that punitive damages are rarely awarded 
and highly correlated to the defendant’s conduct, as evinced by the various 
empirical studies noted above.  In the event of an uncharacteristic jury award, 
additional procedural safeguards ensure that such awards can be scaled back 
after the verdict has been announced.  To maximize the effectiveness of these 
safeguards, post-verdict review could occur at both the trial court level and the 
appellate court review. 
 
99.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1992); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West 1990); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (2003); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 15-33-135 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (1986); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201(1)(a) (West 2011).  
100.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (West 1995) (“Exemplary 
damages against the party against whom the claim is asserted shall only be awarded in a civil 
action when the party asserting the claim proves beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of 
a wrong.”).  
101.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1322 (justifying punitive damages). 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
The very premise of the United States’ tort system is to provide remedy 
and redress.  In situations like those presented in the introduction above, the 
injured plaintiff may overcome Pennsylvania’s strict sovereign immunity statute 
in order to recover some form of damages.  On the other hand, the government 
and its employees are neither adequately punished nor deterred for the 
intentional actions that lead to those plaintiffs’ injuries.  The basic purpose of 
punitive damages is to prevent individuals from engaging in similar misconduct 
again in the future.  This goal can be accomplished regardless of who the 
defendant is, but it cannot be achieved if punitive damages awards are 
prohibited.  Today, Pennsylvania’s legislature must propose and adopt new 
legislation that would allow recovery of punitive damages in order to achieve 
this goal.  It would be wise to look to the statutes of Virginia and similarly 
situated states for guidance in this process. 
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